Publications

@article{PetryFichtnerHeemskerk2019b,
title = {Steering capital: the growing private authority of index providers in the age of passive asset management},
author = {J Petry and J Fichtner and E M Heemskerk},
url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09692290.2019.1699147},
doi = {https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2019.1699147},
year = {2019},
date = {2019-12-10},
journal = {Review of International Political Economy},
abstract = {Since the global financial crisis, there is a massive shift of assets towards index funds. Rather than picking stocks, index funds replicate stock indices such as the S&P 500. But where do these indices actually come from? This paper analyzes the politico-economic role of index providers, a small group of highly profitable firms including MSCI, S&P DJI, and FTSE Russell, and develops a research agenda from an IPE perspective. We argue that these index providers have become actors that exercise growing private authority as they steer investments through the indices they create and maintain. While technical expertise is a precondition, their brand is the primary source of index provider authority, which is entrenched through network externalities. Rather than a purely technical exercise, constructing indices is inherently political. Which companies or countries are included into an index or excluded (i.e. receive investment in- or outflows) is based on criteria defined by index providers, thereby setting standards for corporate governance and investor access. Hence, in this new age of passive asset management index providers are becoming gatekeepers that exert de facto regulatory power and thus may have important effects on corporate governance and the economic policies of countries.},
keywords = {capital flows, index funds, index providers, passive asset management, private authority, stock market indices},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}

@article{AntitrustChronicle,
title = {The New Mandate Owners: Passive Asset Managers and the Decoupling of Corporate Ownership},
author = {C Shenkar and E M Heemskerk and J Fichtner},
url = {https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2988937},
year = {2017},
date = {2017-06-14},
journal = {Competition Policy International Antitrust Chronicle},
volume = {Spring 2017 Volume 1},
number = {3},
pages = {51-57},
abstract = {A major shift toward passively managed index funds in recent years has led to the re-concentration of corporate ownership in the hands of just three large asset management firms, the Big Three: BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street. We propose that this trend has re-structured ownership in capital markets. Adopting a contractual view to the corporate share, we re-define share holding and suggest that the New Mandate Owners in fact hold the essence of corporate power, as their aggregated positions capture the core element of the franchise of corporate voting.},
keywords = {corporate ownership, passive asset management},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}